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RECENT CASES

looking to the future trends in the areas of parent-child tort immunity and guest statute application to young children. First of all,
although a majority of states still adhere to the doctrine of parentchild tort immunity, it appears that this doctrine will receive less
emphasis in the future. Under the principles of modern tort law,
the social value of allowing a cause of action for every plaintiff
seems to outweigh the desirability of allowing parents to be immune
from all tort actions brought by their unemancipated child.4 2 The
second area, involving the liberalized interpretation of guest law
application to young children, will not undergo a rapid change.
Guest laws are statutory creations and hence, a strong argument
can be made that such laws should not be judicially interpreted to
exclude young children, but rather should be changed only by legislative action. 43 Notwithstanding the problems involved in judicial

liberalization of guest statutes, 4 4 future decisions may show a willingness of courts to exclude minor children from guest statute application due to the seeming injustice of allowing a very young
child to legally bind himself in a 'guest' status.
DAVID

INSURANCE-RISKS AND

S.

MARING

CAUSES OF LoSS-PAYMENT

OF REWARD BY

plaintiffs had
jewelry stolen, which was insured under defendant's insurance policy
providing coverage for loss by theft. The value of the stolen property exceeded the $2,000 coverage limit. Plaintiffs, in attempting to
recover the property, offered a reward in excess of the policy limits.
Voluntary payment was made by the plaintiffs with knowledge that
the company refused to participate in offering such a reward. Upon
defendant's refusal to reimburse, the plaintiffs sued defendant claiming that payment of the reward was a loss by theft. The trial
court found in favor of the defendants. The question considered
on appeal by the Supreme Court of Oregon was whether a payment
of a reward is covered under a provision in an insurance policy
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42. In most cases, the parent would still be immune from tort liability for activities
involving parental control and authority. This immunity, however, would not extend to
all types of tort actions, i.e., injuries sustained by an unemancipated child to the parent's
negligent operation of a motor vehicle. See generally W. PRossxR, supra note 3, § 122.
43. See generally Note, supra note 39.
44. The problems involved in judicial liberalization of guest laws include:
(1)
determining what affect the liberalization would have on present automobile accident
insurance policies; and, (2)
determining what age group should he excluded from
guest statute application. See generally Note, supra note 22.
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providing for a "loss by theft." In an unprecedented decision,
the court reversed the trial court and held that the term "loss
by theft" should be given a broad interpretation to embrace a
reward paid for the return of stolen property. Gowans v. Northwestern Pacific Indemnity Co., -Or.-, 489 P.2d 947 (1971).
In prior cases, the Supreme Court of Oregon had determined
that if there was any ambiguity or doubt in the meaning of terms
in an insurance policy, such terms were to be resolved in favor
of the insured.1 In adhering to this policy, the majority in Gowans
based its decision on the fact that "loss by theft" is legally ambiguous and therefore must be liberally construed in favor of the
insured. 2 The court further reasoned that the loss sustained by
the plaintiffs in paying the reward would not have occurred if
not for the original theft, and therefore the payment was a loss
by theft.3
The Gowans' analysis is consistent with the trend of other
courts in deciding what should be considered a loss by theft. They
have interpreted loss to mean more than just the direct loss resulting from nonrecovery of stolen articles. 4 Examples of the extension
by the courts to cover indirect losses are numerous. Some courts
have ruled that expenses incurred by the insured to restore goods
to their former condition, which were damaged while stolen, is
deemed recoverable unless the policy expressly excludes this expense. 5 Other courts have interpreted loss by theft to include
less consequential expenses such as expenses of recovering the
stolen property 6 and also of its transportation back to the place
stolen. 7 Courts have not only allowed costs of restoration or property, but also losses such as the diminution of value of an automobile during continuance of theft,8 as well as money paid to
detective agencies in attempting to recover stolen property.9 The
extent of coverage of indirect losses seems to know no limit. Howl. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 206 Or. 298, 292 P.2d 492, 495
(1956) : Nugent v. Union Auto. Ins. Co., 140 Or. 61, 12 P.2d 343, 345 (1932).
-. Ore._
489 P.2d 947, 948 (1971).
2. Gowan v. Northwestern Pac. Indem. Co.,
3. Id. at 949.
4. Buxton v. International Indem. Co., 47 Cal. App. 583, 191 P. 84 (1920); Federal
Ins. Co. v. Hiter, 164 Ky. 743, 176 S.W. 210 (1915); Bolling v. Northern Irs. Co., 253
App. Div. 633, 3 N.Y.S.2d 599, appeal denied 254 App. Div. 736, 6 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1938),
aff'd 280 N.Y. 510, 19 N.E.2d 920 (1939); Alamo Cas. Co. v. Laird, 229 S.W.2d
214 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Housner v. Baltimore-American Ins. Co., 205 Wis. 23, 236
N.W. 546 (1931).
5. See, e.g., Housner v. Baltimore-American Ins. Co., 205 Wis. 23, 236 N.W. 546,
548 (1931).
6. Alamo Cas. Co. v. Laird, 229 S.W.2d 214, 218 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
7. Kansas City Regal Auto Co. v. Old Colony Ins. Co., 196 Mo. App. 255, 195 S.W.
579, 580 (1917).
8. Federal Ins. Co. v. Hiter, 164 Ky. 743, 176 S.W. 210, 211 (1915); Boiling v.
Northern Ins. Co., 253 App. Div. 633, 3 N.Y.S.2d 599, 601 (1938), appeal denied 254 App.
Dlv. 736, 6 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1938), affd 280 N.Y. 510, 19 N.E.2d 920, (1939).
9. Buxton v. Int'l. Indem. Co., 47 Cal. App. 583, 191 P. 84, 88 (1920).
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ever, there has been disagreement as to whether or not a person
who purchases a stolen automobile in good faith, and later has
it repossessed by the rightful owner, is covered under a theft
insurance policy.'0 The courts, in favoring non-liability, contend
in such a case that a person who has the right to possession
can not be considered a thief.11
The defendant in Gowans contended that a voluntary payment
of a reward by the plaintiffs was not a loss by theft. 1 2 The majority
ruled that this contention had no merit and mentioned that defendant had cited no cases to support his theory. 18 However, a prior
federal court, in determining what would be considered a loss,
used a definition from Webster's Dictionary which defined it as
"the unintentional parting with something of value.' 4 From this
it is logical to assume that a voluntary payment was an intentional
parting with something of value, and therefore does not constitute
a loss by theft. Another court, in deciding the extent of coverage
included in a theft insurance policy, reasoned that: "It is one
thing to insure against the happening of a contingency, but still
another to insure against loss occasioned by the happening of a
contingency."' 5 Consequently, a person could conclude that to insure
against a loss by theft is one thing, but it is still another to
insure against a voluntary payment of a reward occasioned by it.
Chief Justice O'Connell, dissenting in Gowans, believed that
because the defendant insurance company is under an obligation
to pay for the loss of the jewelry if not recovered, it should
be given the privilege of determining whether it wants to offer
a reward for the property's return. 6 This seems to be sound
logic when considering the fact, as in the present case, that most
insurance companies might not want to offer a reward which is
in excess of the policy limit, but would rather offer a smaller
reward hoping that this will be sufficient to recover the stolen
property. The Chief Justice also expressed the fear that the holding
is likely to induce people to offer large rewards for the return
10. Kelley Kar Co. v. Finkler, 155 Ohio St. 541, 99 N.E.2d 665 (1951); Hudiberg
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Globe Indem. Co., 394, S.W.2d 792 (Tex. 1965); Barnett V. London
Assur. Corp., 138 Wash. 673, 245 P. 3 (1926). Contra, Talasek v. Travelers Fire
Ins. Co., 242 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Riley v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 176 Ohio St. 16,
197 N.E.2d 362 (1964); Phil Phillips Ford, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 454
S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
11. Talasek v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 242 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1957); Riley v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 176 Ohio St. 16, 197 N.E.2d 362 (1964) ; Phil Phillips Ford Inc. v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 454 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
12. Gowans v. Northwestern Pac. Indem. Co.,
-Ore.-,
489 P.2d 947, 948
(1971).
13. Id. at 949.
14. Providence Journal Co. v. Broderick, 104 F.2d 614, 616 (1st Cir. 1939).
15. Frank v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 109 So. 2d 594, 596 (Fla. 1959).
16. Gowans v. Northwestern Pac. Indem. Co.,
-Ore._
489 P.2d 947, 950
(1971).
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of property of great sentimental, but little economic value.1 However, he failed to cite any cases supporting this line of reasoning.18
A study of North Dakota statutory'9 and case law20 seems to
indicate that, if a case with a fact situation similar to Gowans
arises in this state, the holding will probably follow that of the
present case as long as the insurance clause is found to be ambiguous. It is an established rule of construction in North Dakota
that any ambiguous clause in a contract will be construed against
the party writing it.21 The North Dakota Supreme Court has stated
that if there is a possibility of interpreting terms of an insurance
policy in two different ways, the interpretation imposing liability
22
will be adopted.
Gowans does not clearly state a solution to defendant's problem
of the endless limit of coverage of indirect losses under a "loss by
theft" policy. However, North Dakota courts and other state courts
have indirectly provided an answer to this dilemma. They have
consistently held that unambiguous terms of an insurance policy
will be given their ordinary meaning. 2 It would appear insurance
companies could eliminate their problem by providing coverage
for only "direct" losses. In a New Jersey case a provision for
"direct loss by theft" enabled an insurance company to avoid
liability where clothes were damaged by moths after thieves removed
them from their packages and abandoned them in the owner's
summer cottage.2 4 The court reasoned that in an ordinary interpretation, "direct loss by burglary, theft or larceny" does not include
this type of loss. 2 5 In a similar instance,2 0 the cost of the services
of .a private fire department called to extinguish a fire was also
nonrecoverable since the cost was not considered a "direct loss
by fire." In comparing the terms of the policies and the holdings of
the above two cases with the term and holding in Gowans, it is
apparent that the insertion of one word into the policy could alleviate the defendant's problem.
In conclusion, it should be noted that in Gowans neither party
17. Id
18. Id.
19. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-19 (1960).
20. Baurle v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. of Bloomington, Ill., 153 N.W.2d 92 (N.D.
1967) ; Prince v Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 143 N.W.2d 708 (N.D. 1966).
21. Baurle v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. of Bloomington, Ill., 153 N.W.2d 92, 95 (N.D.
Anderson v. Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 149 N.W.2d 378, 381 (N.D. 1967).
1967)
22. Schmitt v. Paramount Fire Ins. Co., 92 N.W.2d 177, 178 (N.D. 1958).
23. Miller Elec. Co. v. Employers Llab. Assur. Corp., 171 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1965) ; Schmitt
v. Paramount Fire Ins. Co., 92 N.W.2d 177 (N.D. 1958); Conlin v. North American Life
& Cas. Co., 88 N.W.2d 825 (N.D. 1958) ; Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. McMillan, 217 Tenn.
125, 395 S.W.2d 798 (1965).
24. Down- v. New Jersey Fidelity & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 91 N.J. Law 523, 103 A.
205 (1918).
25. Id. at 206.
26. Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. McMillan, 217 Tenn. 125, 895 S.W.2d 798, 799 (1965).
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cite any cases that were directly in point and that the court was
also unable to find any supporting cases. 27 This emphasizes the
point that where theft insurance terms are ambiguous the courts
have never specified the limit of coverage. Even though there
seems to be some sound reasons for not extending loss by theft
to cover all indirect losses, at present, insurance companies must
rely on proper drafting to clearly define the limit of coverage
for theft losses.
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